Philosophy

[GranmasGotGame]

But the future and past are just linguistic constructs. By conflating the two you're creating an argument which only has meaning as an abstraction of language but is devoid of epistemological meaning.

That which we experience does not change once we have experienced it. That which we have experienced becomes that which we know. That which we know was at one point that which we didn't know. That which we do not know does not change. So while there is abstraction to the premises, it is still based off knowledge that we obtain and is still within the grounds of epistemology.

 

[Slade]

snibbidy snab

Gödel's theorems pertain only to axiomatic systems, primarily deductive ones, so they don't specifically apply in the context of this discussion. Perhaps there is some fundamental connection between the incompleteness of axiomatic systems and physical quantum systems but that's less objective than I'm aiming for here.

snip

Our brains tend to be extremely selective in how long term memory is encoded, but that's beside the point. For your theory to make sense, you have to view the future in the past tense, which is inherently contradictory. It's more meaningful in a poetic sense than a logical one, and philosophy sometimes treads the fine line between the two separate subsets of language.

 

[CaptainHook]

Trying to keep things as simple as possible:

I doubt free will, and here's why. No one knows if quantum indeterminacy translates on a larger scale to living beings.

But it isn't looking good for free will I'm afraid. Atoms, which is the next level from sub-atomic particles, act in extremely predictable ways. It's called chemistry, and it's strictly mathematical, which means it's predetermined.

How someone can think indeterminacy somehow translates into complex biological organisms is a little bit a stretch, considering how predictable atoms are, and considering that all cells are basically made up of atoms.

I think our brain creates this illusion of choice, when there isn't really one. Neurological studies have pointed out that electrical activity in certain brain regions PRECEDES conscious activity. In other words, first your brain is spinning its gears and THEN you make a 'decision' or have a thought or feeling.

I'm not entirely sure why our brains do this to us. I see no evolutionary reason why living things would 'need' to feel like they are in control. It's a damn convincing illusion, since someone could easily say "but I'm choosing to wave my arm around right now, as we speak. Is that not free will?" But then I could tell him that his act of moving his arm and trying to prove to himself and I that I'm wrong, was determined and was reaction based off me telling him that free will is an illusion.

It's confusing and unintuitive, mainly because the illusion is making it almost impossible to even conceive of such a notion as determinism. It's easy for us to look at a volcano eruption and say it was predetermined by physics. It's even easy for us to look at animal behavior and say it was predetermined by instinct. But human beings? Hell no. And that is because human beings are too complex for us to accurately predict. There are just too many variables to even make sense of it.

After all, how can a human being, with the limitations of their brain, possibly have complete understanding of all human beings and make predictions? It's like trying to use the brain to map out the brain of not just ourselves but everyone else too.

Predicting human behavior will always be outside of our grasp, but that doesn't mean that it's not predictable. I suppose the only thing that COULD do such a thing would be an extra-terrestrial far beyond us.

But then, of course, everyone will call you stupid for even suggesting such a thing. "of course we have free will, stupid!". What appears self evident to the layman and even the educated, might very well end up being bullshit.

 

[CaptainHook]

Nietzsche>all other philosophy :)

 

[iKotomi]

Gödel's theorems pertain only to axiomatic systems, primarily deductive ones, so they don't specifically apply in the context of this discussion. Perhaps there is some fundamental connection between the incompleteness of axiomatic systems and physical quantum systems but that's less objective than I'm aiming for here.

There is a difference between a physical system and knowledge of the system. The first is a natural phenomenon, the second is our interpretation of natural phenomena. We never discuss the physical system directly because we have no way to prove anything about the system itself- we only discuss our observations, conclusions, and predictions about the system using the laws that we believe are true at the time. Our system of knowledge is axiomatic, and no meaningful conclusions can take place without a common agreement on what axioms are true.